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TENTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS STATE MANDATORY RETIREMENT
POLICY AGAINST FEDERAL AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT
EEOC v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595 (D. Wyo. 1981), cert. granted,
50 U.S.L.W. 3527 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982) (No. 81-554)
In EEOC v. Wyoming' a federal district court ruled that application
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 2 to Wyoming's
mandatory retirement policy for game wardens who exercise police
powers contravenes the tenth amendment 3 protection of state sover-
eignty under the principles established by National League of Cities v.
Usery.4
The Wyoming Game and Fish Department, in accordance with a
mandatory retirement policy,' retired Bill Crump at age fifty-five from
his position as game warden. On behalf of Crump and others similarly
situated, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)6
brought suit against the State of Wyoming, the State of Wyoming Re-
tirement System, and nine of the state's officials.7 The suit alleged that
1. 514 F. Supp. 595 (D. Wyo. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3527 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982)
(No. 81-554).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1976), as amended by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-236, 92 Stat. 189 [hereinafter cited as ADEA]. The defini-
tion of "employer" in the current code was broadened in 1974 to include state and local govern-
ments. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 55.
3. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
4. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
5. The Wyoming State Highway Patrol and Game and Fish Warden Retirement Act, Wyo.
STAT. § 31-3-107(c) (1977), states: "An employee may continue in service on a year-to-year basis
after ... age fifty-five (55), with the approval of employer and under conditions as the employer
may prescribe." Pursuant to the authority granted by this statute, the Wyoming Game and Fish
Commission on November 3, 1977 adopted a mandatory retirement policy for all employees not
serving in administrative positions. The court in EEOC v. Wyoming found that under the Table
of Organization of the Game Division of the State Game and Fish Department, game wardens
were employed in non-administrative positions. 514 F. Supp. at 597.
6. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was established by the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (1976), as amended by Act of Mar. 27, 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-251, § 2(a)(l 1), 92 Stat. 183. Congress directed the EEOC to "prevent any person from
engaging in any unlawful employment practice," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a), and empowered it with
various enforcement procedures, including the authority to bring a civil suit on behalf of a person
or persons charging an unfair labor practice. Under Reorganization Plan No. I of 1978, enforce-
ment of the ADEA was transferred from the Department of Labor to the EEOC. Exec. Order No.
12,144, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,193 (1979). See also note 55 infra;
7. The individual defendants included the governor, the members and directors of the Wyo-
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the mandatory retirement policy constituted an unfair labor practice in
violation of the ADEA.s The defendants moved to dismiss the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, 9
arguing that under the protection granted the states by the tenth
amendment and the Supreme Court's holding in National League of
Cities v. Usery, the ADEA could not be applied to a state's retirement
policy for employees engaged in law enforcement. 10 Granting the mo-
tion, the district court held: The federal interest and policy promoted
through application of the ADEA to the states does not sufficiently out-
weigh the states' interest in maintaining the integrity of its employer-
employee relationship in providing traditional state law enforcement
and wildlife management functions so as to make such an exercise of
congressional commerce clause authority constitutional under the tenth
amendment. "1
Congressional authority to regulate commerce' 2 is plenary in scope,
subject only to the affirmative limitations contained in the Constitution
and those limits derived from the nation's federalist constitutional
structure.,3 Chief Justice Marshall first outlined the expansive breadth
of the commerce clause in the 1824 decision of Gibbons v. Ogden . 4
The Supreme Court, however, inconsistently enforced judicial limits on
ming Game and Fish Commission, and the director of the Wyoming Game and Fish Department.
These nine officers were named as defendants in both their individual and official capacities. The
court dismissed the complaint against them in their individual capacities, holding that they were
"entitled to a qualified privilege or immunity." 514 F. Supp. at 596.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1976) states that "lilt shall be unlawful for an employer to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's age." Id Subsection ()(2) further provides that "no. . . seniority system or employee
benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual specified by sec-
tion 631(a) of this title because of the age of such individual." Id § 623()(2) (Supp. III 1979).
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
10. 514 F. Supp. at 596. Two sections of the Wyoming Code include game wardens, along
with police officers, highway patrolmen, and other law enforcement officials, in the definition of
"peace officer." Wyo. STAT. § 7-2-101 (1981) (Criminal Procedure Act); id § 9-3-1901(vii) (1977)
(Peace Officers Training Act). The Game and Fish Act, Wyo. STAT. § 23-6-101 (1977), grants
game wardens the power of arrest over persons found violating the Act.
11. 514 F. Supp. at 600.
12. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cL 3 grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes."
13. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSnUTInO NAL LAW §§ 5-1 to 5-8 (1978).
14. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). "This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete
in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than those
prescribed in the constitution." Id at 196.
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congressional use of the power in the century following Marshall's ten-
ure.' 5 The Court often found congressional regulation of private eco-
nomic activity violative of the tenth amendment,16 while federal police
regulation of activities often withstood challenge.17 Beginning with
15. Compare Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (Coal Conservation Act of 1935
held unconstitutional on ground that its regulation of wages, hours, and working conditions
touched intrastate commerce beyond the scope of congressional commerce clause power); Schecter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (National Industrial Recovery Act held un-
constitutional); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton K-R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (federal statute estab-
lishing a compulsory retirement and pension plan for railroad employees held invalid); Hammer
v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (federal Child Labor Act of 1916 held unconstitutional on
ground that Congress could not control working conditions for children by prohibiting the trans-
portation of goods produced in interstate commerce), overruled, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941); The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908) (federal statute abolishing con-
tributory negligence and fellow servant rules for railroad employees held unconstitutional); and
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to
the horizontal monopolization of the sugar refining industry denied) with Brooks v. United States,
267 U.S. 432 (1925) (Motor Vehicle Theft Act held constitutional); Weeks v. United States, 245
U.S. 618 (1918) (Pure Food and Drug Act held constitutional); Caminetti v. United States, 242
U.S. 470 (1917) (Mann Act forbidding the transportation of women across state lines for immoral
purposes held constitutional); Houston E. & W. Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)
(ICC regulation of intrastate freight rates affirmed); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913)
(Mann Act held constitutional); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (Pure Food
and Drug Act held constitutional); Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911) (railroad
federal safety appliance legislation held inapplicable to intrastate trains); Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) (Sherman Anti-Trust Act held applicable to intrastate meat dealers);
and Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (Federal Lottery Act of 1895
prohibiting interstate commerce of lottery tickets held constitutional). See generally Barber, Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery: New Meaning For the Tenth Amendmenti 1976 Sup. CT. Rv.
161; Stem, The Commerce Clause andthe NationalEconomy, 1933-1946. Part 1, 59 HARV. L. REv.
635 (1946).
16. The Constitution established a national government with powers deemed to be ade-
quate, as they have proved to be in both war and peace, but these powers of the national
government are limited by the constitutional grants. Those who act under these grants
are not at liberty to transcend the imposed limits because they believe that more or dif-
ferent power is necessary. Such assertions of extra-constitutional authority were antici-
pated and precluded by the Tenth Amendment ....
Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528-29 (1935). See also Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled, United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Cf. United States v. Butier, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (tenth amend-
ment limit on the spending power); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259
U.S. 20 (1922) (tenth amendment limit on the use of federal taxation to prevent child labor). See
generally LIBRARY OF CONGRESs, THE CONSTrrTUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION 1263-71 (2d ed. 1972).
17. See, eg., Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925) (Motor Vehicle Theft Act held
constitutional); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) (Mann Act forbidding the trans-
portation of women across state lines for immoral purposes held constitutional); Champion v.
Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (Federal Lottery Act of 1895 prohibiting interstate
commerce of lottery tickets held constitutional). See also note 15 supra.
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NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. , however, the Court reversed
its earlier position and upheld the National Labor Relations Act of
1935 as a valid exercise of congressional commerce clause authority.19
Jones & Laughlin signaled the abandonment by the Court of its search
for an objective and judicially enforceable limit on congressional use of
the commerce clause power to regulate private activity.2" Ultimately,
in United States v. Darby,2 a unanimous Court adopted Chief Justice
Marshall's language22 in upholding the validity of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938 (FLSA).23 This decision firmly established the ple-
nary scope of the commerce clause power, unlimited by the tenth
amendment.24
After Darby and before 1976, Congress acted under the commerce
clause in an almost limitless fashion, regulating intrastate activities that
18. 301 U.S. I (1937).
19. The Court stated that intrastate activities may be regulated by Congress under the com-
merce clause "if they have such a close and substantial relationship to interstate commerce that
their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions,"
Id at 37.
20. Professor Wechsler contended that the Supreme Court failed to articulate a neutral prin-
ciple limiting congressional exercise of any enumerated powers. It was this failure that forced the
Court to relinquish its search for such limits. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitlu-
tionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1959). Professor Barber argued that the Court need not have
abandoned the tenth amendment as a limit on Congress' exercise of the commerce power. He
stated that use of Chief Justice Marshall's construction of the tenth amendment would properly
have allowed the Court to uphold economic regulations, including those governing labor condi-
tions, wages, hours, pricing, and competitive practices, as valid exercises of federal authority to
regulate economic activities as "commerce." Barber, supra note 15, at 170-71. The tenth amend-
ment, however, deteriorated as a valid check on congressional power when the Court upheld fed-
eral police regulation. Id at 171-72. See Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936) (upholding
constitutionality of the Lindbergh Act); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding
constitutionality of the Mann Act). Professor Barber appeared to be arguing that the Court
should distinguish between federal economic regulation and police regulation and allow the for-
mer, but not the latter, as a constitutional exercise of the commerce clause power. Whether such a
distinction could be sufficiently articulated as a limitation on congressional exercise of the com-
merce clause power is open to debate.
21. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
22. See note 14 supra
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1976).
24. The court concluded:
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.
There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more than declara-
tory of the relationship between the national and state government as it had been estab-
lished by the Constitution before the Amendment or that its purpose was other than to
allay fears that the new national government might seek to exercise powers not granted
and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. at 124. See generally 13 URB. L. ANN. 169 (1977).
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had only a slight or remote impact upon interstate commerce.25 The
Bill of Rights provided the only substantive limitation on Congress'
otherwise unrestrained power to regulate commerce.z6 The Supreme
Court repeatedly rejected tenth amendment challenges to congressional
regulation of state and local governments under the commerce clause,27
thereby delegating to the legislative branch the task of placing substan-
25. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding the application of the
federal loan shark statute to a purely intrastate extortionate credit transaction); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding application of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to a restau-
rant on the ground that food purchased by the restaurant moved in interstate commerce); Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding application of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 against a motel that served out-of-state guests); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)
(upholding enforcement of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 against individual farmers
producing insubstantial amounts of grain for sale in interstate markets under an aggregate market
theory). See generall Stem, The Commerce Clause Revisited-he Federalization of Intrastate
Crime, 15 Aaiz. L. Rnv. 271 (1973). See also Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The
Nex, Federalism and.4ffirmative Rights to Essential Governmental Services, 90 HARV. L. R-v. 1065,
1071 (1977).
26. See, e-g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1968) (commerce clause power limited by
fifth amendment); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (commerce clause power limited
by sixth amendment). But see Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946)
(first amendment does not bar application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to publishers).
27. Even before NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), see notes 18-19
supra and accompanying text, the Court rejected a tenth amendment challenge to congressional
regulation of state activities under the commerce clause, holding that a state owned and operated
railroad was subject to federal safety regulation. United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
The Court later extended this holding, allowing application of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.
§§ 151-64 (1976), to the same state operated railway. California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957). In
Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Alabama State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), the Court also ap-
plied the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976), to a state owned railway.
Congressional use of the commerce clause to regulate state activity reached its greatest breadth in
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1965), overruled, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976), and Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975). In *fZrtz, the Supreme Court upheld
application of the Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. No. 89-601 § 102(a)(1), 80 Stat. 830, 831
(1966) (repealed 1976), which had brought under the FLSA employees of state hospitals, institu-
tions, and schools. Wirtz, however, was overruled by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976). Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), upheld, over tenth amendment objections,
the application of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799 (ex-
pired 1974), to the states. In a footnote in the majority opinion, however, Justice Marshall stated:
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a "truism," stating merely that
"all is retained which has not been surrendered," United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
124 ... (1941), it is not without significance. The Amendment expressly declares the
constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the
States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.
421 U.S. at 547 n.7. See general& Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1945) (Emergency Price Control
Act held applicable to the states under the war power); Note, National League of Cities v. Usery:
Its Imfplicationsfor the Equal Pay Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment ,4t, 10 U. MICH.
J. L. REF. 239, 245 & n.36 (1977).
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tive limits on its own power.28
In NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery29 the Court reasserted the tenth
amendment as an affirmative limitation on the commerce clause power.
Under the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974,30 Congress ex-
tended coverage of the FLSA to include virtually all state and local
government employees.3 1  A divided Court32 declared the wage and
hour provisions of the amendments unconstitutional. Writing for the
majority, Justice Rehnquist33 stated that the Court never doubted the
existence of limits on the power of Congress to override state34 sover-
eignty and concluded that the tenth amendment is an express constitu-
tional declaration of such limitations. Justice Rehnquist reasoned
that one attribute of state sovereignty to be protected is the authority of
state and local governments to control employer-employee relation-
ships in areas of traditional governmental functions. 36 The Court held
that applying the wage and hour provisions of the FLSA to the states
would displace this control and impair the freedom of the states "to
structure integral government operations" 37 in providing these tradi-
tional governmental services. Such action by Congress under the com-
28. Professor Wechsler argued that the political process is the chief factor restraining Con-
gress' use of its delegated powers. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of
the States In The Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543
(1954). See also Tribe, supra note 25, at 1071. Tribe contended that a state's influence as an entity
in the political process may have been lessened in recent years. Id at 1072-73.
29. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
30. Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) -(s)(5), -(x) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
32. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell, Rehnquist, and Blackmun, who filed a
concurring opinion formed the majority. Justice Brennan dissented in an opinion in which Jus-
tices White and Marshall joined. Justice Stevens filed a separate dissenting opinion. Because of
the sharp split among the justices, it will be difficult to predict the outcome of similar future cases,
especially in light of the position taken by Justice Blackmun in his concurrence. See notes 42-47
infra.
33. Many of the foundations for the Court's opinion can be found in Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 549-59 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
34. As the denomination "political subdivision" implies, the local governmental units
which Congress sought to bring within the Act derive their authority and power from
these respective States. Interference with integral governmental services provided by
such subordinate arms of a state government is therefore beyond the reach of congres-
sional power under the Commerce Clause just as if such services were provided by the
State itself.
426 U.S. at 855 n.20.
35. Id at 845.
36. Id at 852.
37. Id
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merce clause "would impair the states' ability to function in a federal
system"38 and is therefore unconstitutional.
National League of Cities left unanswered numerous questions con-
cerning the continued constitutionality of applying other federal regu-
lation to the states through the commerce clause.39 The opinion did not
exhaustively list' or establish criteria for determining what constitutes
a traditional state function essential to a state's "separate and in-
dependent existence."4 Justice Rehnquist also failed to state what de-
gree of intrusion, if any, would be tolerated before congressional action
would be held an unconstitutional exercise of the commerce clause
power.42
38. Id (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)).
39. 426 U.S. at 874 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40. In the text of the opinion Justice Rehnquist listed the areas of fire protection, police
protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation as examples of traditional govern-
mental functions. 426 U.S. at 851. In a footnote he added that "[t]hese examples are obviously
not an exhaustive catalogue of the numerous line and support activities which are well within the
area of traditional operations of state and local governments." Id at 851 n.6.
41. Id at 851. In distinguishing United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936), the Court
appeared to make a distinction between federal regulation of "proprietary" and "governmental"
functions, a classification used in the tax immunity cases. 426 U.S. at 843, 854 n.18. Relying upon
United States v. California, among other cases, Justice Brennan argued that such a distinction
proved to be unworkable in the tax cases and was never extended to the commerce clause. Id at
863-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Barber, supra note 15, at 178. Justice Rehnquist never gave
content to the terms "traditional" and "integral" beyond the short listing, see note 40 supra, and
the analysis distinguishing United States v. California. See Michelman, States' Rights and States'
Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 Yale L.J. 1165,
1172 (1977). Without a developed standard, identifying those activities that are immune from
federal regulation may be difficult, especially during an era of expanding state activity in eco-
nomic and social affairs. See Tribe, supra note 25, at 1072; Note, supra note 27, at 248. The
decisions since National League of Cities do not clarify the issue. See, e.g., Hughes Air Corp. v.
Public Utils. Comm'n, 644 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1981) (regulation of air traffic held not an integral
state function); Vehicle Equip. Safety Comm'n v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion, 611 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1979) (setting of automobile safety standards held not an integral state
function); Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979) (operation of municipal
airport an integral state function); Public Serv. Co. of N.C., Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 587. F.2d 716 (5th Cir. 1979) (state operation of an oil and gas company held not an
integral state function); United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1978) (state licensing of
drivers held an integral state function); Davids v. Akers, 549 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1977) (rules of
state legislature held an integral state function).
42. The Court extensively outlined the fiscal effect of the wage and hour provisions of the
FLSA on state and local governments. 426 U.S. at 846-57. Justice Rehnquist specifically held,
however, that the decision was not premised upon a finding of the financial burdens that the
FLSA would have on the states. He stated that "[w]e do not believe particularized assessments of
actual impact are crucial to resolution of the issue presented, however. For even if we accept
appellee's assessments concerning the impact of the amendments, their application will nonethe-
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Justice Blackmun's concurrence adopted a balancing approach that
weighed the federal interest for regulation and the necessity of state
compliance against the state interest and function to be protected. 43 In
support of his position Justice Blackmun pointed to an apparent bal-
ancing approach used by Justice Rehnquist in one section of the major-
ity opinion.44 That section distinguished the level of intrusion caused
by the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, held valid in Fry v. United
States,45 from the question presented by the Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1974.46 Since National League of Cities, lower courts
have used this approach when confronted with questions regarding the
application of federal regulation to state activities.47
less significantly alter or displace the States' abilities to structure employer-employee relationships
. ...." Id at 851. The Court's disclaimer of its only analysis of FLSA effects on the states
establishes no standard against which a level of intrusion can be measured. This absence of an
articulated standard could have serious consequences. As Justice Brennan stated in his dissent,
My Brethren boldly assert that the decision as to wages and hours is an "undoubted
attribute of state sovereignty," and then never say why. Indeed, they disclaim any reli-
ance on the costs of compliance with the amendments in reaching today's result ...
This would enable my Brethren to conclude that, however insignificant that cost, any
federal regulation under the commerce power "will nonetheless significantly alter or dis-
place the States' abilities to structure employer-employee relationships."
Id at 873-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). See generally Note, Constitutionality of
theADE, After Usery, 30 ARK. L. REv. 363 (1976); Note, supra note 27, at 257. Justice Rehn-
quist appears to have established a standard when he stated that the FLSA operates directly to
displace the states' freedom to structure integral operations. 426 U.S. at 852. The question, how-
ever, remains as to what constitutes "direct" impairment of a state's freedom in light of the Court's
distinguishing of Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975). See note 46 infra. See also National
League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 872-73 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Note, supra, at 367.
43. 426 U.S. at 856.
44. Id
45. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
46. 426 U.S. at 853. Justice Rehnquist distinguished National League of Cities from Fry on
four grounds: (1) The problem at which the legislation in Fry was directed endangered all parts
of the federal structure and could be remedied only by federal action, (2) the means selected only
temporarily interfered with the states' freedom, (3) the federal action did not displace any state
choices as to how state governmental functions were structured, and (4) the Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act actually reduced budgetary pressures on the states by placing a ceiling on wages. Id The
Court's recognition of the first factor apparently upholds Justice Blackmun's contention that when
the federal interest is great and state compliance is necessary, interference with state autonomy
will be permitted. But see id at 872 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. See, ag., United States v. Ohio Dep't of Highway Safety, 635 F.2d 1195 (6th Cir. 1980)
(federal interest in controlling air pollution weighed against state interest in permitting noncom-
plying vehicle to use public streets and highways), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 949 (1981); United States
v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1978) (the federal interest in a nonstatutory equitable remedy for
driving while intoxicated within federal enclave not sufficient enough to outweigh the states' inter-
est in controlling the privilege of driving on its highways).
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Congress extended both the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act48 to cover
state and local governmental employees in the Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1974.49 The Court in National League of Cities failed
to comment on whether the ADEA or the Equal Pay Act may constitu-
tionally be applied to the states, leaving the continued validity of these
statutes in doubt.50
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 19671 was enacted
to address the special problems of age discrimination. 2 The ADEA
makes unlawful discrimination on the basis of age in all aspects of em-
ployment, including the decision to hire53 or discharge,5 4 the level of
compensation and other terms of employment,5 5 and membership in a
labor organization.56 The statute, however, excuses discrimination on
the basis of age under a bona fide occupational qualification "reason-
ably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business." 57
Although a separate statutory scheme, the ADEA is linked to both
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)58 and the FLSA.
Both the ADEA and Title VII are aimed at eliminating employment
48. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
49. Pub. L. No. 93-259, §§ 6(a)(1), 28(a)(2), 88 Stat. 55 (Equal Pay Act and ADEA).
50. For discussion of both the ADEA and the Equal Pay Act, see generally Note, CivilRights
Suits Against State andLocal GoyernmentalEntities and Officials: Rights ofAction, Immunities, and
Federalism, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 945 (1980); Note, supra note 27. For discussion of the Equal Pay
Act, see generally Note,,4pplying the Equal Fay Act to State andLocal Governments: The Effect of
National League of Cities v. Usery, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 665 (1977); 19 URB. L. ANN. 228 (1980).
For discussion of the ADEA, see generally Gillan, The Applicability of the FederalAge Discrimina-
tion In Emplo)rment Act to State Employees: National League of Cities v. Usery, 10 CLEARING-
iOUSE REV. 442 (1976); Note, supra note 42.
51. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1976)).
52. The U.S. Department of Labor study out of which the ADEA evolved stated that age
discrimination, unlike racial discrimination, is not based on dislike for or prejudice against the
injured person. Rather, age discrimination is founded on incorrect assumptions about the effects
of age on job performance. Note, The.Age Discrimination In Employment 4ct of 1967, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 380, 383 (1976) (citing U.S. DEPT OF LABOR, REPORT TO THE CONGR.ESS ON AGE DIscIMI-
NATION IN EMPLOYMENT UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 at 8 (1965)).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1976).
54. Id
55. Id § 623(a)(3).
56. Id § 623(c).
57. Id § 623(f)(1). Title VII contains the same bona fide occupational qualification for all
classifications but race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976). "The existence of the bfoq defense under
both statutes indicates the congressional recognition that under certain circumstances, an em-
ployer may be justified in taking into account an applicant's sex or age in order to determine his or
her suitability for a particular job." Note, supra note 52, at 400.
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
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discrimination based on arbitrary criteria. The almost identical lan-
guage contained in the prohibition sections of the two statutes 9 reflects
this similarity of purpose. Some of the procedural provisions of the
ADEA also parallel those of Title VII.60 Because of this similarity of
purpose, enforcement of the ADEA was transferred in 1979 from the
Department of Labor to the EEOC, placing under the control of a sin-
gle executive agency the effectuation of congressional policy against
employment discrimination based on arbitrary criteria.61 The enforce-
ment provisions of the FLSA were, however, incorporated into the
ADEA. 62
This ADEA link to both the FLSA and Title VII has led to confusion
regarding the congressional power under which the ADEA was en-
acted.63 The statute's statement of purpose,' incorporation of the
FLSA enforcement provisions into the ADEA, 65 and extension of the
ADEA to the states through the 1974 amendments to the FLSA66 lend
support to the conclusion that the ADEA was enacted pursuant to the
commerce clause.67 Conversely, the ADEA's similarity to Title VII in
its fundamental purpose, the existence of similar statutory language,68
and elements of the legislative history of the Act 69 and its amend-
59. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
"[The prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII." Lorillard v. Pons,
434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978).
60. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 633 (1976) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
61. Exec. Order No. 12,144, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,193 (1979). See President's Message to Congress
Transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 400 (Feb. 23,
1978).
62. 29 U.S.C. § 626(a) (Supp. II 1979) (incorporating §§ 9 and 11 of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 209, 211 (1976)); id § 626(b) (1976) (incorporating 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(b),
216-17 (1976)).
63. See generally Note, Civil Rights Suits Against State and Local Governmental Entities and
Officials: Rights ofAction, Immunities, andFederalism, supra note 50, at 1000; Note, supra note 27,
at 260.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(4) (1976) states that "the existence in industries affecting commerce of
arbitrary discrimination in employment because of age burdens commerce and the free flow of
goods in commerce."
65. See note 62 supra.
66. Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a)(2), 88 Stat. 55.
67. EEOC v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595, 600 (D. Wyo. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W.
3527 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982) (No. 81-554). See Note, supra note 42, at 368; Note, Ciil RIghts Suits
Against State and Local Governmental Entities and Officials: ights of ,4ction, Immunities, and
Federalism, supra note 50, at 1000; Note, supra note 27, at 260. See generally Note, supra note 52,
at 381.
68. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
69. Senator Javits originally proposed the inclusion of age discrimination in Title VII, but
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ments70 create an arguable basis for the ADEA's enforcement pursuant
to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.71 Courts generally have con-
strued the provisions of the ADEA according to Title VII precedents,
basing these holdings on the similarities between the tWo. 72  Recent
Supreme Court decisions are inconclusive on this issue, although they
do suggest that each provision of the ADEA should be construed ac-
cording to the statute after which it was modeled.73
Since National League of Cities courts have consistently held that ap-
plication of the ADEA to the states is within the constitutional power
of Congress.74 The rationale usually advanced to support the contin-
Congress rejected that proposal. Arritt v. Grissell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1270 n.l I (1977). Section 715 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, however, did direct the Secretary of Labor to make a study of the
problem of age discrimination in employment. This study formed the basis for the legislative
proposals resulting in the ADEA. H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1967]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2213, 2214.
70. The court in EEOC v. County of Calumet, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 20 (E.D. Wis.
June 12, 1981), quoted numerous passages from the legislative histories of both the 1974 amend-
ment and the ADEA Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189, in support of the
proposition that the ADEA was passed pursuant to § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. See note 77
infra and accompanying text. None of the statements that the court in Calumet quoted specifically
stated that the ADEA was enacted pursuant to § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Rather, the
references are to general statements regarding age discrimination as a protected civil right. See S.
REP. No. 493,95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3, 34, reprintedin [1978] U.S.CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 504-
06, 527; H.R. REP. No. 913, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2849; Gillan, supra note 50, at 442.
71. See Gillan, supra note 50, at 442-44; Note, supra note 42, at 372-75; notes 73-75 infra. See
generally Note, Civil Rights Suits Against States and Local Governmental Entities and Officials:
Rights ofAction, Immunities, and Federalism, supra note 50, at 1105-13; Note, supra note 27, at
266-72.
72. See, ag., Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980); Smithers v. Bailer, 629 F.2d
892 (3d Cir. 1980); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913
(1978); Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1972). But see Lorillard
v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978) (ADEA § 7(c), 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1976), amended in 1978 to include
the right to a jury trial, interpreted according to the FLSA section upon which it was based). See
also Marshall v. Chamberlain Mfg. Corp., 601 F.2d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 1979) (commenting on Oscar
Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750 (1979), and Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978)).
73. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750 (1979); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575
(1978). Oscar Mayer held that because the language of ADEA § 14(6), 29 U.S.C. § 633 (1976),
was adopted from Title VII § 706(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-s(c) (1976), it could be concluded Con-
gress also adopted the judicial construction of § 706 of Title VII and that construction of ADEA
§ 14(b) should follow that of § 706. Lorillard held that ADEA § 7(c), 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1976)
(current version in Supp. m1 1979), should be interpreted according to the construction of FLSA
procedures incorporated into the ADEA, including the right to a jury trial.
74. See, e.g., Arritt v. Grissell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977); EEOC v. County of Calumet,
26 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 20 (E.D. Wis. June 12, 1981); Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 515
F. Supp. 1287 (D. Md. 1981); EEOC v. Florissant Valley Fire Protection Dist., 21 Fair Emp. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 973 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 6, 1979); Marshall v. Delaware River & Bay Auth., 471 F. Supp.
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ued validity of the 1974 amendments to the ADEA is that Congress, in
extending the ADEA to the states, acted pursuant to its authority under
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.75 This conclusion is based on
the similarity between Title VII and the ADEA76 and statements con-
tained in the latter's legislative history.77 In Fitzpatrick v. Bizer78 the
Supreme Court sustained Title VII as a valid exercise of congressional
authority under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment against an
attack based on the eleventh amendment's7 9 protection of state
886 (D. Del. 1979); Remmick v. Barnes County, 435 F. Supp. 914 (D.N.D 1977); Aaron v. Davis,
424 F. Supp. 1238 (E.D. Ark. 1976); Usery v. Board of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 718 (D. Utah 1976).
The Equal Pay Act has also consistently been held constitutional. See, e.g., Pearce v. Wichita Co.,
590 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hosp., 581 F.2d 116 (6th
Cir. 1978); Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 577 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1978); Usery v. Charlestown
County School Dist., 558 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1977); Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544
F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977). See generally note 50 supra.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 states, "The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
- In light of the similar statutory and constitutional objectives of Title VII and Section
623(a) of the ADEA to prohibit arbitrary and discriminatory employment criteria based
on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or age and in the absence of a clear expres-
* sion by Congress in the ADEA of the constitutional foundation for this legislation in the
Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment, this court interprets the ADEA's age
discrimination limitations on state employers in 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a) (1975) as constitu-
tionally permissible under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment is particularly applicable in the present circumstances
where allegations of arbitrary discrimination in employment practices by a state em-
ployer, contrary to Section 623(a) of the ADEA, if proven, would constitute forbidden
state action that denies equal protection of the law. The Court in National League of
Cities specifically expressed no view on whether Congress could achieve "different re-
sults [in] affect[ing] integral operations of state governments by exercising authority
granted it under other sections of the constitution such as . . . § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
Usery v. Board of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 718, 721 (D. Utah 1976).
76. See notes 68-72 supra and accompanying text.
77. After a review of the relevant legislative history, see note 70 supra, the court in EEOC v.
County of Calumet, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 20 (E.D. Wis. June 12, 1981), concluded:
By this point, it should be unnecessary to cite the many other references in the legislative
history to show that Congress, when it passed the 1978 ADEA amendments, considered
age discrimination a denial of equal protection. Thus, although the ADEA itself does
not explicitly state that the 1974 and 1978 amendments extended ADEA protections to
state and local government employees pursuant to Congress' Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power, the legislative history is more than sufficient to reach that
conclusion.
Id at 24.
78. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
79. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI states, "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
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sovereignty. 0
Lower courts have held that because of Fitzpatrick, enforcement of
the ADEA pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment survives
a similiar constitutional attack based on the tenth amendment.,, With
the recent decision in Pennhurst State School v. Halderman,s2 however,
the Supreme Court now appears to require that Congress state clearly
its intent to act under the fourteenth amendment before congressional
policy will be imposed on the states.8 3 Because this clear statement of
intent was lacking when Congress expanded the coverage of the ADEA
to include the states, the validity of this lower court thesis is left in
doubt.8 4
80. 427 U.S. at 445-46. The Court specifically upheld the validity of Title vii, § 703(a), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976), which authorized federal courts to award money damages to a private
individual against a state government found guilty of employment discrimination. 427 U.S. at
448. Handed down four days after National League of Cities, Fitzpatrick recognized that the Con-
stitution granted Congress more authority to regulate state activities when acting pursuant to the
fourteenth amendment than when acting pursuant to the commerce power.
81. See Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1977); EEOC v. County of Calumet, 26
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 20, 21 (E.D. Wis. June 12, 1981); Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore,
515 F. Supp. 1287, 1292 (D. Md. 1981); Remmick v. Barnes County, 435 F. Supp. 914, 916
(D.N.D. 1977); Usery v. Board of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 718, 721 (D. Utah 1976). See generally
Gillan, supra note 50, at 443; Tribe, supra note 25, at 1097-99; Note, supra note 42, at 373-74;
Note, Civil Rights Suits Against State and Local Governmental Entities and Officials: Rights ofAc-
tion, Immunities, and Federalism, supra note 50, at 1097-1111; Note, supra note 27, at 266-72.
82. 101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981).
83. Although this Court has previously addressed issues going to Congress' power to
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641, 651 (1966); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445 (1975), we have had little occasion to consider the appropriate test for determining
when Congress intends to enforce those guarantees. Because such legislation imposes
congressional policy on a State involuntarily, and because it often intrudes on traditional
state authority, we should not quickly attribute to Congress an unstated intent to act
under its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Our previous cases are whol-
ly consistent with that view, since Congress in those cases expressly articulated its intent
to legislate pursuant to § 5. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, supra (intent expressly stated in
the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Oregon v. Mitchell, supra (intent expressly stated in the
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, supra (intent expressly
stated in both the House and Senate Reports of the 1972 Amendments to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964); cf. South Carolina Y. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (intent to enforce the
Fifteenth Amendment expressly stated in the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
Id at 1539.
84. No explicit statement of the authority under which Congress enacted the ADEA amend-
ments appears in either the statute or the legislative history. The court in EEOC v. County of
Calumet, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 20 (E.D. Wis. June 12, 1981), however, found sufficient
evidence of congressional intent in the legislative history supporting a finding under the Pennhurst
standard that Congress acted pursuant to the fourteenth amendment. ld at 22-23. See notes 67-
70 & 75 supra and accompanying text.
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Courts have also upheld application of the ADEA to the states under
the commerce clause.85 Using a balancing test apparently derived from
Justice Blackmun's concurrence in National League of Cities,86 the
courts have found that the federal interest in preventing employment
discrimination on the basis of arbitrary criteria outweighs any insignifi-
cant intrusion into integral state functions caused by the ADEA.
87
EEOC v. Wyoming88 rejected those precedents established since Na-
tional League of Cities89 and held conversely that application of the
ADEA to the mandatory retirement policy of the Wyoming Game and
Fish Commission unconstitutionally violates the tenth amendment.
Judge Brimmer, writing for the Federal District Court for Wyoming,
began his analysis by rejecting the EEOC's contention that Congress
extended the ADEA to the states pursuant to its authority under section
5 of the fourteenth amendment.90 Based on its reading of the standards
established by Pennhurst State School v. Halderman,9' the Wyoming
district court was unable to discover the necessary statement of con-
85. Aaron v. Davis, 424 F. Supp. 1238 (E.D. Ark. 1976). Accord, EEOC v. County of
Calumet, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 20,25 (E.D. Wis. June 12, 1981); Marshall v. Delaware
River & Bay Auth., 471 F. Supp. 886, 892 (D. Del. 1979). Cf Pearce v. Wichita County, 590 F.2d
128 (5th Cir. 1979) (Equal Pay Act, as an exercise of congressional commerce clause power, not an
unconstitutional intrusion into state sovereignty); Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 577 F.2d 1 (7th
Cir. 1978) (same).
86. See notes 43-47 supra and accompanying text.
87. It is the opinion of the Court that although the Age Discrimination Act does alter the
state's ability to structure employer-employee relationships by forbidding the states to
discriminate between employees on the basis of age, that alteration does not significantly
interfere with the policy choices of the state's elected officials and administrators as to
how best to allocate the state's financial resources in discharging the state's primary func-
tion (within the framework of the Constitution) of administering the public law and
maintaining the public health and welfare. Furthermore, there is no evidence before this
Court from which to conclude that the Age Discrimination Act significantly alters the
manner in which the City of Little Rock allocates its financial resources to provide its
citizens with fire protection. There is absolutely no basis for this Court to conclude that
the very separate and independent existence of the states' ability to function effectively
within the federal system is endangered by a law which prohibits the City of Little Rock
from discriminating between firemen age 62 and firemen age 65 without an empirical
justification for doing so.
Aaron v. Davis, 424 F. Supp. 1238, 1241 (E.D. Ark. 1976). Accord, EEOC v. County of Calumet,
26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 20, 25 (E.D. Wis. June 12, 1981); Marshall v. Delaware River &
Bay Auth., 471 F. Supp. 886, 892 (D. Del. 1979). See generally Note, supra note 42, at 368-72;
Note, supra note 27, at 261-66.
88. 514 F. Supp. 595 (D. Wyo. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3527 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1982)
(No. 81-554).
89. See notes 74-87 supra and accompanying text.
90. 514 F. Supp. at 598-99. See notes 68-70 & 75-81 supra and accompanying text.
91. 101 S. Ct. 1531 (1981). See notes 82-83 supra and accompanying text.
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gressional intent supporting a finding that the ADEA extension by the
1974 amendments was to be enforced via the fourteenth amendment. 92
Congress' incorporation of the FLSA enforcement provisions into the
ADEA, unrefuted by anything contained in the 1974 amendments or
their history, also contributed to the court's conclusion that Congress
acted under its commerce clause power.93
Pursuant to this finding the court in EEOC v. Wyoming then applied
the limitations of the tenth amendment outlined by National League of
Cities to the issue presented. 94 Relying upon Justice Rehnquist's
enumeration of traditional state functions contained in the majority
opinion of NationalLeague of Cities,9" the court held that wildlife man-
agement by game wardens exercising police functions lies within the
protected categories of state governmental services. 6 Judge Brimmer
concluded that a rational state policy interest-the need for young law
enforcement officers-would be displaced by application of the ADEA
to the Wyoming Game and Fish Department.97 Any such displace-
ment would affect Wyoming's ability to provide services traditionally
afforded its citizens and would therefore be contrary to the tenth
amendment and the holding of National League of Cities.98
Judge Brimmer concluded by referring to Justice Blackmun's "bal-
ancing approach" as central to a proper understanding of National
League of Cities.99 The court first noted that mandatory retirement
policies exist for various federal law enforcement agencies. The federal
interest shown by such policies, like Wyoming's interest in its retire-
ment policy, was inconsistent with the federal interest against age dis-
crimination that the EEOC was attempting to impose on the states.
Using this information in its balancing analysis, the court found that
the state's interest in having young officers for police protection and
wildlife management outweighed the federal interest in prohibiting age
discrimination."'°
92. 514 F. Supp. at 599-600.
93. Id at 600.
94. Id
95. 426 U.S. at 851. See note 40 supra.
96. 514 F. Supp. at 600.
97. Id
98. Id
99. Id See notes 43-47 supra and accompanying text.
100. 514 F. Supp. at 600.
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Considering the relevant precedents,' 10 the core of Judge Brimmer's
holding is that Congress extended coverage of the ADEA to the states
through its commerce clause power and not pursuant to section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment. 0 2 The evidence marshaled by the court, how-
ever, inconclusively supports its contention. Reliance on the incorpora-
tion of FLSA enforcement provisions into the ADEA as circumstantial
evidence that Congress acted pursuant to the commerce clause 0 3 is
without merit. Numerous provisions of the ADEA, including the state-
ment of prohibition, were modeled after Title VII which was enacted
pursuant to the fourteenth amendment."° The hybrid nature of the
ADEA provides inconclusive support for either argument.
The legislative history upon which the court relies 0 5 also fails to pro-
vide clear support. Following the lead ofPennhurst,10 6 the court appro-
priately required a clear statement of congressional intent before
approving extension of the ADEA to the states pursuant to section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment.1 0 7 Judge Brimmer's findings that neither
the statutory language nor the legislative history contain a sufficient
expression of congressional intent10 8 conflict, however, with the explicit
findings of another court.'09 Furthermore, Judge Brimmer did not con-
sider the similarity of purpose that exists between the ADEA and other
congressional prohibitions against discrimination enforced pursuant to
the fourteenth amendment." 0 Without a full consideration of this as-
pect of the issue, the inconclusive nature of the other evidence offered
by the court leaves suspect its finding that Congress enacted the ADEA
under its commerce clause power.
After concluding that Congress enacted the ADEA amendments pur-
suant to its commerce clause authority,"' EEOC v. Wyoming inconsis-
tently applied NationalLeague of Cities. The court properly found that
law enforcement and wildlife management constitute integral state
101. See notes 74-87 supra and accompanying text.
102. 514 F. Supp. at 598-600.
103. Id at 600.
104. See notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text.
105. See notes 67 & 77 supra.
106. See notes 91-92 supra and accompanying text.
107. 514 F. Supp. at 599-600.
108. Id
109. EEOC v. County of Calumet, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 20 (E.D. Wis. June 12,
1981). See note 77 supra.
110. See note 59 supra.




functions protected by the tenth amendment and National League of
Cities. 12 Authority also exists for the finding that compulsory retire-
ment for law enforcement officials is a legitimate state interest. 1 3 Nev-
ertheless, the court failed to apply properly the "balancing approach"
that was the stated basis for its decision." 4 The ADEA's disruptive
effect on Wyoming's mandatory retirement policy was inadequately as-
sessed in light of the bona fide occupational qualification contained in
the statute.' 5 Proper balancing of federal and state interests involves
an accurate assessment of the degree of federal intrusion into the pro-
tected state function. The decision in EEOC v. Wyoming is lacking in
this important respect because Judge Brimmer protected the integral
state function from any federal intrusion rather than considering at
what point the intrusion becomes intolerable. Until the Supreme Court
clarifies National League of Cities,"6 such a rigid application of the
balancing principle is unwarranted. The court should have properly
applied Justice Blackmun's balancing approach," 7 weighing the
ADEA, with its bona fide occupation qualification exception allowing
age discrimination for rational ends, against Wyoming's mandatory re-
tirement policy.
EEOC v. Wyoming therefore represents an application of National
League of Cities that is inconsistent with precedent and that improperly
applies the standards established for review of federal intrusions into
traditional state activities. On certiorari, the Supreme Court should
reverse the decision, and hold that application of the ADEA against the
states is constitutional as either a proper exercise of commerce clause
power or a proper exercise of congressional authority pursuant to sec-
tion 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
NL.M.
112. See notes 29-46 supra and accompanying text.
113. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (mandatory retire-
ment policy for law enforcement officials does not violate the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment). The issues presented in Murgia did not raise the question of the application
of the ADEA to the same compulsory retirement scheme.
114. 514 F. Supp. at 600.
115. See note 57 supra.
116. See notes 39-42 supra and accompanying text.
117. See notes 43-47 supra and accompanying text.
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